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ELROD V. BURNS: CHIPPING AT THE ICEBERG OF
POLITICAL PATRONAGE
Political patronage has been defined as "the appointive positions
in government awarded either for past political services or in expecta-
tion of future work."' The term also covers governmental benefits and
services distributed by office-holders. The practice in America pre-
dates the Constitution, although its popularization occurred later,
during the administrations of Presidents Jackson, Lincoln and
Franklin Roosevelt.' The practice became so pervasive that a politi-
cian's success virtually hinged on his ability to dispense patronage.
Officials who did not understand or use patronage well were invaria-
bly ineffective administrators.
3
Eventually public concern over the excesses of patronage led to
reform. The Pendleton Act4 created a federal civil service where hir-
ing and firing was done on a non-partisan basis. The Hatch Act 5
sharply curtailed the political activity of most federal employees,
further removing politics from government administration. Despite
these legislative efforts to reduce the scope of patronage, judicial
challenges to the system historically have met with little success.6
In Elrod v. Burns,7 the Supreme Court faced for the first time a
constitutional challenge to the venerable institution of political pa-
tronage. In December, 1970, several employees of the Cook County,
Illinois, Sheriff's Department were dismissed from their jobs after a
change in the political administration.' None of the discharged em-
F. SORAUF, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 82 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as SoRAUl]. Another commentator defines patronage jobs as "all those posts,
distributed at the discretion of political leaders, the pay for which is greater than the
value of the public services performed." Wilson, The Economy of Patronage, 69 J. POL.
ECON. 369, 370 n.4 (1961).
2 For a brief but fascinating history of patronage from the ancient Chinese to the
present, as well as a more extensive treatment of the practice in modem politics, see
M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, To THE VIcTOR (1971) [hereinafter cited as TOLCMN].
Id. at 91.
Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 40
U.S.C.).
5 Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18
U.S.C.).
4 See notes 50, 51, 53, 61 and 62 infra.
96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976).
In 1970, Richard Elrod, a Democrat, was elected to replace a Republican as
sheriff of Cook County. All of the respondents were Republicans. When Elrod assumed
office he began to replace all non-civil service employees of the department according
to the custom with members of his own party. 96 S. Ct. at 2678-79.
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ployees held policy-making positions, and none was protected by civil
service or other legislation against summary dismissal. They were
given the "opportunity" to retain their jobs by switching party alle-
giance or obtaining the support of a party official.9 Failure to make
an acceptable choice resulted in termination of employment. The
dismissed employees brought suit in federal district court, but their
request for an injunction against further dismissals was denied.'0 The
Seventh Circuit reversed," finding that the employees stated a valid
claim for relief,'" and ordered that the appropriate injunction be
granted.
Before affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether patronage, or the "spoils system,' 3 violated first
amendment rights; whether those rights were absolute; and whether
any compelling state interests would justify a restraint on those
rights. The Court concluded that dismissal of non-policymaking
employees solely because of political affiliation impermissibly in-
fringed their first amendment rights of free political association.'4
In declaring dismissal of non-policymaking employees solely for
their political affiliation unconstitutional, the Court readily identi-
fied the restraints that the practice imposed on freedoms of political
belief and association. Direct infringement resulted from pressure on
the employee to pledge or switch his allegiance to the party in power
in order to retain his job.'5 Requiring the employee to work for the
I Id. at 2679.
,0 Burns v. Elrod, No. 71-C-607 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1972). Plaintiffs alleged that
their dismissals on the basis of political affiliation violated their rights of association
under the first and fourteenth amendments. The grounds for denial of the injunction
were failure to show irreparable injury from the loss of the jobs and the existence of
an adequate remedy at law. Subsequent to the denial, the judge granted defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
" Burns v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1975).
" The memorandum opinion stated that it recognized a cause of action under the
authority of Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973). See note 55 infra. In Lewis, the same court had held that
non-civil service employees cannot be dismissed solely on the basis of their political
affiliations. "If ... a discharge is motivated by considerations of race, religion, or
punishment of constitutionally protected conduct, it is well settled that the State's
action is subject to federal judicial review." Id. at 568.
'1 The term is generally considered to have orginated with William L. Marcy, a
United States Senator from New York, in an 1832 speech in which he declared "to the
victor belong the spoils of the enemy." IX ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPAEDIA 433
(15th Ed. 1974).
" 96 S. Ct. at 2689. See text accompanying note 20 infra.
Is Id. at 2681. The spoils system can thereby "chill" the exercise of free speech.
"If [the employee] is inclined to surrender his right to associate freely with the party
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election of party candidates and contribute a portion of his wages
imposed an additional restraint. Since his position rarely enabled the
employee to contribute time and money to two parties, his forced
support of one diminished his voluntary support of the other.', Fur-
thermore, if an individual pledged allegiance to retain his job, he
compromised his beliefs. The Court found the electoral process af-
fected by these requirements even as to individual employees, since
the incumbent party could tip the balance of power in its own favor
with this coerced support. Where the scope of the patronage practice
is substantial relative to the size of the electorate, the impact on the
operation of the democratic system could well be significant.'"
The optimal functioning of the democratic system depends upon
freedom of political belief, and any practice which coerces this belief
is abhorrent to the Constitution.'8 Freedom of belief in all areas,
particularly politics, includes the correlative freedom to associate
with others for the advancement of those beliefs.'9 To the extent,
of his choice in order to retain government employment, it is also quite likely that he
will tend to suppress speech which is critical of the new incumbent party and its
elected representatives." Note, A Constitutional Analysis of the Spoils System-The
Judiciary Visits Patronage Place, 57 IowA L. REV. 1320, 1333 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Patronage Place].
", 96 S. Ct. at 2681. The advantages of this system to the political parties were
tremendous. The party often "maced" the patronage payroll for compulsory party
contributions. Furthermore, the appointee often had a great deal of free time to spend
in party work. Patronage blessed the party with jobs for the worker, free labor for the
party, and contributions for the party coffers from the public treasury. SORAUF, supra
note 1, at 90.
'1 96 S. Ct. at 2681. Injunctions against political activities by patronage employees
have been granted on the grounds that such activities impaired the interests of voters
in an equal voice in elections where use of public employees to perform partisan
political tasks could create substantial, and perhaps massive, political effort in favor
of "ins," against "outs." Shakman v. Democratic Organization, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir.
1970). Injunctions were also granted where such activity acted as a state subsidy in
favor of endorsed candidates, discriminating against non-endorsed candidates. White
v. Snear, 313 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
" Regardless of the nature of the inducement, "[i]f there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). In Bamette, the Court held that requiring school
children to salute the American flag infringed their first amendment freedom of reli-
gion, when to salute violated their religious beliefs. Id.
" Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). A state statute, which forbade a citizen
to vote in a political primary if he has voted in the primary of another party within
the prior twenty-three months, was held unconstitutional as an undue restriction on
freedom of association. The Court stated: "The right to associate with the political
1977]
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then, that patronage required or prohibited certain beliefs, the Court
found the practice harmful to the democratic process, 20 and contra-
dictory to decisions of the Court forbidding government action that
conditioned public employment on political faith.21
The Court cited three cases in particular as authority for its hold-
ing that patronage dismissals of non-policymaking employees are
unconstitutional: United Public Workers v. Mitchell;2 2 Wieman v.
Updegraff;3 and Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy.2 All
three cases involved conditions imposed upon public employment,2
and dicta in all three state that political affiliation is not a valid
prerequisite.2 1 In each case, however, the final decision to uphold or
party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom." Id. at
57:
20 96 S. Ct. at 2682. Although freedom of speech is the only right expressly men-
tioned in the first amendment, other rights have been found to be implicit in the
concept of free speech. Freedom to associate with others of similar beliefs is a right
without which freedom of belief would mean very little. Therefore, the first amend-
ment protects orderly activities related to beliefs, including membership in organiza-
tions through which one may express his beliefs. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945). The trend expanding the protection of the first amendment is consistent with
the broad view that "[t]he very purpose of the first amendment is to foreclose public
authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the
press, speech, and religion." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). Protection of association in the context of patronage is a logical extension of this
view.
21 96 S. Ct. at 2682. E.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); and United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
330 U.S. 75 (1947). In Mitchell, federal employees unsuccessfully challenged the
constitutionality of the Hatch Act, see note 5 supra, which forbade active participation
by federal employees in political campaigns.
= 344 U.S. 183 (1952). The Wieman Court held unconstitutional an Oklahoma
statute which required every state employee to sign an oath that he did not belong
either to a Communist front organization or a subversive group.
2, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). The Court held that summary revocation of the security
clearance of a civilian employee on a Naval installation did not violate her right to due
process.
2 The statute in Mitchell required employees to refrain from active political in-
volvement. All applicants for state jobs had to sign the loyalty oath in Wieman, and
proper security clearance was a prerequisite to the job in Cafeteria Workers.
26 In Mitchell, "[aippellants urge[d] that federal employees are protected by
the Bill of Rights, and that Congress may not 'enact a regulation providing that no
Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office'. . . . None would deny
such limitations. . . ." 330 U.S. at 100. The Court assumed in Cafeteria Workers that
"... Rachel Brawner could not constitutionally have been excluded from the Gun
Factory .. .because she was a Democrat or a Methodist." 367 U.S. at 898. The
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invalidate the challenged condition rested upon a determination that
the condition was or was not arbitrary and discriminatory." The
Elrod Court appeared to read Mitchell, Wieman, and Cafeteria
Workers as holding that political affiliation is always an arbitrary and
invalid criterion. A closer review of these cases indicates that any
criterion upon which government benefits are conditioned will be
held unconstitutional if the criterion bears no logical relationship to
the benefit and if it results in an unjustified infringement of a funda-
mental right.2s
The doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," applied in
Wieman Court quoted the language from Mitchell with approval. Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), contained similar language. Reversing the
decision of the New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners which refused petitioner's appli-
cation to take the bar exam, the Schware Court stated that the petitioner obviously
"could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member
of a particular church." Id. at 239.
27 The Court sustained the revocation of the security clearance in Cafeteria
Workers although no grounds for the revocation were given. The result would have been
different, however, "if the announced grounds for her exclusion had been patently
arbitrary or discriminatory. . . ." 367 U.S. at 898. The loyalty oath in Wieman fell
"as an assertion of arbitrary power" because it indiscriminately classified "innocent
with knowing activity." 344 U.S. at 191. Even where the standards are permissible,
"officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding
that he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discrimina-
tory." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. at 239. The condition imposed
on plaintiffs in Mitchell was found to be a reasonable means to avoid the "evil of
political partisanship by classified employees of government." 330 U.S. at 96.
2 The purpose of the oath in Wieman was to insure the trustworthiness and
loyalty of state employees. But there was no requirement that the employee actually
be shown to be disloyal in his beliefs and actions. Mere association was sufficient
condemnation. The condition limited innocent as well as guilty association and there-
fore bore no real relation to the purpose. The Court found the statute "patently arbi-
trary and discriminatory" and therefore unconstitutional. 344 U.S. at 192. Where no
rights are infringed, however, and the "government action has [not] operated to
bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy, with an attendant foreclosure from other
employment opportunity" the action will be upheld. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. at 898. Although some infringement was allowed in Mitchell, the restraint
imposed was seen as necessary to avoid greater impairment of other rights, such as the
right of the people to an efficient public service and the right of the employees to
believe as they choose without feeling that "political rather than official effort may
earn advancement." 330 U.S. at 98.
" The doctrine was most clearly stated in a commerce clause case, Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926). A California statute required
that private carriers obtain from the railroad commission a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity, which in effect made the private carriers public ones subject
to all commission regulations. The Court held the statute unconstitutional because it
accomplished indirectly what the fourteenth amendment forbids directly. If the State
may demand surrender of one right as a condition of its favor, it may demand surrender
of all. Constitutional guarantees could thus be made meaningless. Id. at 593-94.
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Mitchell, Wieman and Cafeteria Workers, declared that whatever an
express constitutional provision prevents the government from doing
directly it equally prevents the government from doing indirectly. 0
Therefore, the government may not deny a benefit so as to infringe
constitutionally protected interests.3 While the doctrine has been
applied to invalidate conditions imposed upon the right to vote,3 2 the
receipt of welfare3 and unemployment benefits,
3 4 tax exemptions, "
the ability to serve on a jury,30 and the grant of radio-telegraph licen-
ses,37 its most frequent application has been to protect first amend-
ment rights.38 The principle, therefore, is particularly applicable to
patronage dismissals.
The Court also cited two cases which applied the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine to restraints on public employment that infringed
11 Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 1439, 1446 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne]. At least
one commentator has dared to ask why the government should not be allowed to do
indirectly what it may not do directly. French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An
Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234 (1961) [hereinafter cited as French]. Professor French
argued that the doctrine assumes its conclusion, that "exactly the same effects will
flow from [indirect action] as from direct action." Id. at 242.
"' Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). Other cases in which the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions has been applied to invalidate denials of public
employment include: Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (plaintiff's
dismissal from teaching job for criticism of school administration violated freedom of
speech); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (loyalty oath required of state employ-
ees held overbroad and an unconstitutional condition upon employment); and Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1960) (state could not deny appellant office to which he was
appointed on basis of his refusal to declare belief in God).
3 Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (state statute which prevented citizen
from voting in political primary if he had voted in primary of another party within prior
23 months declared unconstitutional); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (state poll tax struck down as unconstitutional condition upon right to vote).
1 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state statute which denied welfare
benefits to aliens who had not resided in United States for specified number of years
held unconstitutional).
"' Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (decision that plaintiff was ineligible to
receive unemployment benefits because she refused to accept available job which
required her to work on Sabbath day of her faith infringed upon her religious freedom).
11 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (taxpayers could not be required to sign
declaration that they did not believe in or advocate violent overthrow of federal or state
governments to qualify for tax exemption).
11 Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947) (plaintiff's dismissal from teaching
job because of her absence while serving on federal jury held unconstitutional).
" Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Commandant of Coast
Guard station could not deny license to appellants because of former membership in
Communist party).
11 See cases cited note 31 supra.
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first amendment rights: Keyishian v. Board of Regents39 and Perry
v. Sindermann.'0 Keyishian held New York's loyalty oath require-
ment unconstitutional for overbreadth, finding that it "chilled" the
exercise of first amendment rights. In Perry, the Supreme Court held
that one's first amendment rights are violated if he is dismissed from
his teaching job because of his criticism of the college administration.
The Elrod Court determined that together Keyishian and Perry indi-
cate that the government may not deny a benefit such as public
employment merely on the basis of political affiliation. To do so
would allow an indirect penalty on the exercise of a constitutional
right." Patronage operates exactly in this manner because it indi-
rectly penalizes the employee for exercising the right to believe and
speak as he wishes, and pressures him to conform to beliefs endorsed
by the political party in power. The result is unconstitutional, and
under Keyishian and Perry, the condition is invalid.
Under traditional unconstitutional conditions analysis, no justifi-
cation would have been accepted. If the Court found that the condi-
tion infringed a specific right, 2 the condition was held unconstitu-
tional. Since there was no weighing or balancing, the appearance of
judicial objectivity was preserved. 3 The basic flaw of the doctrine,
however, was the inflexibility of application. The doctrine assumes
that attaching certain conditions to government-connected activity
results in the same evil as does imposing such conditions on activities
not connected with government." Often the condition may be quite
' 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Appellants, faculty members and employees of a New York
state university, sought a declaratory judgment that New York's loyalty laws were
unconstitutional. All employees were required to sign a statement that they were not
members of the Communist party and did not advocate the violent overthrow of
governments, as a condition of their continued employment. The Court held the stat-
utes unconstitutional because they potentially stifle the exercise of first amendment
rights. Id. at 604.
40 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In Perry- respondent was employed in a state college system
under a series of one year contracts, but with no formal tenure. When the Regents
decided not to renew his contract, he filed suit alleging that the decision was based
upon his public criticism of the college administration and thus violated his first
amendment rights. The Court held that if his statements were the basis for dismissal,
his rights had been infringed. Respondent was entitled to a hearing at which he could
offer proof of an impermissible basis for his dismissal. Id. at 597.
1 96 S. Ct. at 2683:
12 Although United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) found that
state interests justified infringements on first amendment rights, see note 28 supra, it
did not involve an express constitutional right.
Van Alstyne, supra note 30, at 1442.
Id. at 1448.
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reasonable under the circumstances." In other cases, the condition
may not involve an express constitutional right but may be a more
unreasonable restraint in the particular situation." Accommodation
of these situations and others where strong governmental and individ-
ual interests conflict requires a more flexible approach.
The Elrod Court found such a flexible approach in Shelton v.
Tucker. 7 Shelton involved an Arkansas statute requiring teachers to
disclose the names of all organizations in which they were members.
Teachers who had refused to supply the required list and whose con-
tracts had not been renewed as a result filed a suit challenging the
requirement. The teachers' valid interest in freely associating to ex-
change ideas was balanced against the State's valid concern about
the moral and professional fitness of its teachers." When the two
sides appeared to be of equal importance, the Court considered
whether the condition furthered the governmental interest by the
least restrictive means possible.49 The condition in Shelton did not
meet that test, and the Court held the statute unconstitutional. Had
the individual interest outweighed that of the state, the same result
would have been reached without the second inquiry. However, had
the statute related to a "clear public interest, threatened not doubt-
fully or remotely, but by clear and present danger," 5 the infringe-
Is E.g., Hollon v. Pierce, 257 Cal. App. 2d 468, 64 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1967), where a
school bus driver was dismissed because of his membership in a religious sect which
advocated burning schools and murdering students. Requiring him to relinquish either
his beliefs or his job was not found to be an unconstitutional burden in view of the
overwhelming state interest in the safety of school children. 64 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
" For example, a statutory requirement that all elementary school teachers have
brown hair would not infringe a specific constitutional right, but would clearly be an
arbitrary and unreasonable condition to impose upon governmental employment.
47 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
11 Mr. Justice Frankfurter defended the statute in a dissenting opinion, 364 U.S.
at 490. The number of organizations to which the teacher belonged was relevant be-
cause they could "consume his time and energy and interest at the expense of his
work." Id. at 494. Disclosure also revealed persons with whom a teacher associated
outside of his work who could shed light on the teacher's conduct. Id. at 494.
1' Id. at 488. The statute did not require that the disclosures be kept confidential,
nor did it restrict the membership of the organizations which must be disclosed to
those which might bear in some way on the teacher's moral and professional fitness.
If the concern was that the teacher over-extend himself to the detriment of his job,
the nature of the organizations would not seem as important as the number. Id. at 486.
* Thomas v. Collins, 343 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). Governmental interests which have
been found sufficient to overcome individual rights include: prevention of actual and
apparent corruption of the political process, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
stability of state's political system, Stover v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); integrity of
government employment system, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); na-
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ment of individual rights it imposed would have been justified. In
Elrod, the individual interests in free association were of great im-
portance. The Court would thus allow patronage dismissals to con-
tinue only upon a showing by the government that they furthered a
more compelling interest by the least restrictive means.
The Elrod defendants argued, however, that no such justification
was necessary if the employees waived the rights infringed by patron-
age dismissals.5' The defendants contended that a waiver could be
implied from the circumstances under which the employee obtained
the job.2 Acceptance of a patronage job, knowing it to be such, might
constitute a waiver of one's first amendment rights so that dismissal
would afford no grounds for objection. 3 The Court, however, found
little merit in this argument and summarily dismissed it.54 Since no
qualification may be constitutionally imposed absent an appropriate
justification, no waiver may be constitutionally accepted.
The difficulty that courts have experienced in dealing with the
tional security, Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); competence and
fitness of teachers, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); fitness and suitability for
public service, Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); prevention of
political strikes, American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); and
efficiency of the public service, Singer v. C.S.C., 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976).
Governmental interests which have been found insufficient include: regulation of
labor unions, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); taxation, Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); administration of the welfare system, Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); integrity of the legal system, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963); and prevention of friction within the educational process, Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
5, Waiver is the relinquishment of or refusal to accept a known right. Bennecke v.
Insurance Co., 105 U.S. 355, 361 (1881).
52 Compare Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff accepted
patronage position with full realization of its conditions and hazards) with Bond v.
County of Delaware, 368 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (plaintiff began work unaware
that his position was a patronage job). See also Patronage Dismissals, Fourth Circuit
Review, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 505 (1976).
m Judicial attitude on the subject was expressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527,
280 A.2d 375 (1971). "Those who, figuratively speaking, live by the political sword
must be prepared to die by the political sword." Id. at 378.
96 S. Ct. at 2683 n.13. The Court stated:
Since the qualification [of political conformity] may not be
constitutionally imposed absent an appropriate justification, to ac-
cept the waiver argument is to say that the Government may do what
it may not do. A finding of waiver in this case, therefore, would be
contrary to our view that a partisan job qualification abridges the first
amendment.
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waiver theory 5 should now be resolved by the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of waiver as a defense. The position taken in Elrod is entirely
consistent with judicial recognition of valid waivers of other constitu-
tional rights." Waivers of constitutional rights are accepted only if
they were knowingly and voluntarily made. 7 The actions of persons
seeking government jobs could never be termed "voluntary" in the
sense the law requires due to the "increasingly pervasive nature of
public employment,"" which may constitute such a powerful induce-
ment as to amount to coercion. Particularly in times of high unem-
ployment, the citizen nay feel that he has no alternative to submit-
ting to the infringement and to changing his political affiliation in
order to secure or maintain a job.
Although first amendment rights may not be validly waived in
" Prior judicial treatment of the waiver theory had been inconsistent. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court had adopted the waiver theory and denied relief to the em-
ployees. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527,
280 A.2d 375 (1971). Accord, Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974). The
Seventh Circuit rejected the waiver theory in Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis,
473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972). Presaging the result in Elrod, the Court in Lewis held
that non-policymaking state employees not protected by civil service could not be
discharged solely for refusing to transfer their political allegiance from one political
party to another. However, the Court did hold that because the plaintiffs accepted the
jobs as patronage they had no entitlement to them. Therefore, the government was not
required to afford the employees a hearing before dismissal in order to comply with
due process. Note, The Spoils System: Ripe for Justiciability? 34 U. Prrr. L. REv. 699,
704 (1973).
The California Supreme Court did not take a clear position either way. In Bogacki
v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 489 P.2d 537, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1971), noted in
12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 599 (1972), the court affirmed the government employer's right
to dismiss an employee summarily, but qualified the holding by stating that public
employment may not be conditioned upon a waiver of constitutional rights absent a
showing of compelling interest by the State. 489 P.2d at 545. However, since the
employee failed to show that his dismissal resulted from exercise of his constitutional
rights, the State was not required to show a compelling interest.
Rights which may be waived include: the privilege against self-incrimination,
Lee v. County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, 267 N.E.2d 452, cert. denied,
404 U.S. 823 (1971); right to counsel, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); and
right to trial by jury, Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892).
" Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938).
11 96 S. Ct. at 2683 n.13. As of 1974, roughly 14 million people occupied govern-
ment jobs at all levels, comprising some 19% of all employed persons in the United
States. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., 265, 351 (1974). The
growing size of the job market filled by the government has facilitated a gradual change
in judicial attitude toward patronage, making courts less tolerant of the practice.
O'Neil, Politics, Patronage and Public Employment, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 725, 727 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as O'Neill.
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this situation, they are not absolute. Restraints have been permitted
for "appropriate reasons."59 The state may rebut the "presumptive
prohibition on infringement" 0 by showing strong countervailing in-
terests.' Absent evidence of the state interests, the presumption
arises that any condition imposed on public employment is an in-
fringement.
2
To circumvent the presumption, the Elrod defendants argued
that since no right to public employment exists, employment may be
burdened or denied as the government sees fit. 3 The defendants re-
lied on Bailey v. Richardson,64 which held that a government em-
ployee could be dismissed for any or no reason without violating the
Constitution. The Elrod majority rejected the reasoning of Bailey,
that the government may dismiss an employee for any reason because
it is not obliged to hire anyone, stating that "the right-privilege dis-
tinction furnishes no ground on which to justify patronage."65 Bailey
had been tacitly overruled in Board of Regents v. Roth,64 a 1972 case
1' 96 S. Ct. at 2683. In United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), the Court held that limits on political activities
of federal employees imposed by the Hatch Act, see note 5 supra, were justified to
assure the impartial execution of the laws and the appearance of impartiality, prevent
one party's using the machinery and coffers of the government "to build an invincible
and perhaps corrupt political machine," id. at 565, and "to further serve the goal that
employment and advancement in the Government service not depend on political
performance. . . ." Id. at 566. See note 50 supra.
96 S. Ct. at 2683.
, See text accompanying note 50 supra.
'2 See discussion of unconstitutional conditions accompanying notes 29-41 supra.
The theory that the distinction between rights and privileges somehow affects
the application of constitutional safeguards resulted from the expansion of Justice
Holmes' famous epigram: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics,-but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of
New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). The Massachusetts Supreme
Court dismissed the complaint of a policeman who had been discharged for expressing
political opinions contrary to those of his superior. Similar reasoning was tentatively
approved by the Supreme Court in Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
44 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 341
U.S. 918 (1951). The appellant in Bailey was a civil service employee dismissed without
a hearing on grounds of suspected disloyalty. The court of appeals sustained the dis-
missal and held that Bailey was essentially serving at will and could be dismissed for
any reason. 182 F.2d at 58. The court stated that the Constitution "does not prevent
Republican Presidents from dismissing Democrats, and Democrat Presidents from
dismissing Republicans." Id. at 59. The courts considering claims by government
employees that their dismissals for political reasons violated first amendment rights
relied on that reasoning to deny relief. See Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir.
1974); Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972);
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dealing with denial of public employment for the exercise of first
amendment rights. Since the notion apparently remained after Roth
that Bailey was still valid precedent, the Elrod Court was obliged to
overrule it expressly.
The fatal difficulty with the right-privilege analysis is that the
conclusion is derived from a faulty syllogism. The fallacy may be seen
when the syllogism 7 is stated:
Major premise: A benefit may be excluded altogether.
Minor premise: Government employment is a benefit.
Conclusion: Government employment may be subjected to
any burden whatsoever.
The conclusion does not follow from the premises because a fourth
term, not included in either premise, has been inserted. Logically,
something which may be denied absolutely is not the same as a thing
which may be burdened, although the imposition of a burden would
be regarded as less onerous than exclusion of the benefit. "The 'power
of absolute exclusion' is a term not identical with the 'power of rela-
tive exclusion.' "68 Therefore, if the government chooses to bestow a
Norton v. Blaylock, 409 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1969); Moldawsky v. Lindsay, 341 F. Supp.
1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Shapp,
443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971); Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 402 Pa. 151,
166 A.2d 278 (1960). There have been, however, a growing number of recent exceptions.
Calo v. Paine, 521 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1975); Indiana State Employees Ass'n v. Negley,
501 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1974); Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973); Bond v. County of Delaware, 368 F.
Supp. 618 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
One difficulty with the right-privilege doctrine is its basic premise-that the indi-
vidual is free to choose between employment by the government, or any other benefit,
and the exercise of his constitutional rights. Comment, Political Patronage and Uncon-
stitutional Conditions, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 720, 724 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Unconstitutional Conditions]. Indeed, he may be free to choose. However, that fact,
"deemed ritual by privilege theorists," does not render it inappropriate to ask
"whether, given the total impact of the state action in question, it is constitutional to
require the individual to make such a choice." French, supra note 30, at 248.
1 96 S. Ct. at 2684. The Court cited three cases which dealt with conditions
imposed upon government benefits: Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Gra-
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In
each case the condition was held to be invalid because of its unconstitutional effect.
The Court "rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a govern-
mental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege'." 96 S. Ct. at 2684, n.15,
quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 374.
" 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
'" Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 64, at 724. Powell, The Right to Work
for the State, 16 COLuM. L. Rav. 99, 111 (1916) [hereinafter cited as Powell].
" Powell, supra note 67, at 111. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
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benefit at all it must do so in an equitable and impartial manner.
Unable to overcome the presumption against the infringement of
first amendment rights, the state in Elrod argued that it did have
legitimate interests furthered by the spoils system. The defendants
asserted that the interests in effective government and employee effi-
ciency is served by incentives inherent in patronage. The state rea-
soned that employees will perform their work zealously to insure the
party's incumbency and thus their jobs. That zeal makes employees
and hence the government more accountable to the public. Moreover,
when government administration does change hands, dismissal of
employees of opposite political persuasion eliminates the possibility
of bureaucratic sabotage.69
The Court was not convinced that patronage actually served those
interests best, because other interests of a political nature oppose the
maintenance of patronage. Responsiveness to public wishes is guar-
anteed by the ability of elected officials to discharge employees for
cause. 0 The interest in efficiency could not possibly be served by the
wholesale dismissals that occur each time political office changes
hands. The certainty of a present employee that he will be replaced
when the new administration takes office can destroy the incentive
to perform to the best of one's ability during the transition period.
Moreover, there is no assurance that the replacement will be better
qualified.
7'
However logical it may be to assume that a "lame-duck" em-
ployee will perform poorly, the Elrod Court objected to the assump-
tion that mere differences of political persuasion motivate inferior
performance.72 Prior cases dealing with such a notion regarding mem-
bership in the Communist party73 required evidence of actual inclina-
tion to what the Court terms "ill-willed conduct."74 Membership in
" 96 S. Ct. at 2686. Examples of such "sabotage" can be found in a criticism of
the civil service system which sounds remarkably similar. "Civil servants, considered
by some to be 'human paperweights,' can sabotage an administration through laziness,
inefficiency, or by being just plain ornery. Unaccountable to anyone, they can easily
thwart those who are accountable to the electorate." TOLCHIN, supra note 2, at 102.
71 See note 85 infra.
71 96 S. Ct. at 2686. For a thorough discussion of both the state and individual
interests involved in the patronage situation, reflecting the reasoning of the Court, see
Patronage Place, supra note 15, at 1322-28 and Unconstitutional Conditions, supra
note 64, at 720.
" 96 S. Ct. at 2685.
3 E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952).
11 In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), the Court struck down an Okla-
homa statute because it attached "a conclusive presumption of disloyalty to a person
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traditional political parties is deserving of at least as much protec-
tion.
The defendants articulated a further state interest in the political
loyalty of employees so that policies sanctioned by the electorate can
be carried out effectively. The Court held that this interest can be
protected by limiting dismissals to policymaking positions.75 The
employees most frequently dismissed are those with little if any op-
portunity to exercise discretion. 6 As long as the policymaking person-
nel are chosen for ideological compatibility with elected officials,
responsiveness to the wishes of the voters can be assured.
Finally, the state maintained that patronage is essential to the
democratic process because patronage keeps political parties viable,
and viable political parties maintain the system. The Court pointed
out, however, that the system existed before patronage became prev-
alent and has survived substantial inroads into patronage by merit
systems.7 Thus, the demise of the system without patronage was
not at all certain. Party loyalty and participation is encouraged to
some extent by the possibility of appointment, but because the jobs
solely on the basis of membership or association" without evidence that the person
actively embraced the disruptive doctrines of the organization. Patronage Place, supra
note 15, at 1343. Where the "ill-willed conduct" consisted of instigating political
strikes, the danger to interstate commerce and indirectly to the national security of
the United States was strong enough to justify infringement of first amendment rights.
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), upheld a prohibition
against a member of the Communist party holding an office in a labor union.
11 96 S. Ct. at 2687. The validity of political affiliation as a criterion for the
dismissal of policymaking officials is generally recognized. See, e.g., Indiana State
Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Negley, 501 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1974); Jafree v. Scott, 372 F.
Supp. 264 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Such a person is hired to translate his beliefs into govern-
mental action. Inability to dismiss that person, and thereby change the policy behind
government, would result in "a constitutionalized system of tenure for government
policymakers." Note, The First Amendment and Public Employees, 37 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 409, 422 (1968). Accord, Schoen, Politics, Patronage and the Constitution, 3 IND.
LEGAL FORUM 35, 63 (1969).
11 Justice Douglas, dissenting in United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
115 (1947), noted that the typical civil servant has no more opportunity to make policy
than the average citizen. His work, wholly ministerial, is unaffected by his political
views. Id. at 125 n.13, quoting Morstein Marx, Public Management in the New
Democracy, 205-206 (1940). See also, Patronage Place, supra note 15, at 1344.
" As of 1967, approximately 92% of federal civilian employees were covered by
civil service. Macy, New Challenges in Civil Service, GOOD GOVERNMENr, Fall 1967, at
11.
7 96 S. Ct. at 2687. Even if the demise of the two-party system were substantially
threatened, the existence of two or any set number of political parties is not essential
to the democratic system. In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), a statutory
system which provided a virtual oligarchy to the two major political parties was held
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available are generally unskilled, poorly paid and less desirable, the
incentive has lost much of its force. 9 Thus, the Court held that none
of the justifications offered was sufficiently compelling to warrant
continuing the practice in view of its inhibiting effect on first amend-
ment rights."
The Court did not consider the constitutionality of the spoils sys-
tem against the background of the Equal Protection Clause. Never-
theless, such an analysis provides further support for the ultimate
result. The essence of an equal protection violation is an "impermissi-
ble classification of persons with respect to the laws of the state."',
to be unconstitutional. Referring later to the Williams case, the Court stated that
"[n]o discernible state interest justified the burdensome and complicated regulations
that in effect made impractical any alternative to the major parties." Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724, 746 (1974).
11 Sorauf, The Silent Revolution in Patronage, 20 PUBL. ADMIN. RIv. 28, 30 (1959).
Increasing criticism of patronage has deprived the practice of its respectability as well.
The same author suggests in a later work that because "most patronage jobs did not
demand especially high skill or ability levels-no patronage system can by its defini-
tion expect widespread occupational expertise and experience-it recruited men whose
political skills were also middling . . ." SORAUF, supra note 1, at 90-91. Those it
attracted were generally locally oriented and less concerned with contesting an election
than with collecting their political spoils. "At the same time that patronage was thus
declining in value to the party, it was being reduced in quantity by the spread of civil
service and merit systems of public employment." Id. at 91.
" Cases in which restraints on first amendment rights of public employees have
been allowed, especially C.S.C. v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), and United
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), were distinguished by the Court in that
the restraints imposed in those cases did serve to promote governmental efficiency by
eliminating political coercion. Elrod v. Burns, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2686. The activities
forbidden, active pressure by employers on their co-workers or subordinates to support
a certain party or candidate, were characteristic of patronage practices.
11 Note, Public Employees, 17 VILL. L. REv. 750, 760 (1972). A state's power to
classify persons is "limited only by constitutional rights and by the doctrine that a
classification may not be palpably arbitrary." Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep.
School Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 380 (1960). To be permissible, "the classification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike." F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920). "In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause," courts must consider "the facts and circumstances behind the law, the
interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are
disadvantaged by the classification." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
Furthermore, the boundaries of the doctrine are not easily defined or rigidly fixed. The
reasonableness of legislative classification can be measured against no absolute rule,
but must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v.
King County, 264 U.S. 22 (1924).
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Although patronage is not officially approved by statute, the perva-
siveness of the practice can amount to a de facto legislative classifica-
tion which violates the Equal Protection Clause by protecting some
employees from improper discharge and denying that protection to
others.2
The basic inquiry is whether political affiliation constitutes a rea-
sonable basis for granting or denying the privilege of government
employment.83 If the end to be furthered is efficiency and responsive-
Examples of legislative actions found reasonable and therefore not a denial of
equal protection include: a city ordinance which taxed the gross income of employed
persons and the net income of self-employed persons, Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347
U.S. 231 (1954); a separate classification, for tax purposes, of utilities which are regu-
lated heavily, protected from competition and have fairly stable revenues, New York
Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938); a state statute which
allowed producers of goods identified by brand names or trademarks to contract with
a buyer that the buyer will not resell the goods at less than a certain price, Old
Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936); a state statute which taxed
dividends received from foreign corporations and exempted dividends received from
domestic corporations in proportion to the amount of tax paid by the domestic corpora-
tion, Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935); and a statute which made advocacy of a
resort to violent and unlawful methods of social and political change a crime, if the
penalty applied to all persons. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
Examples of legislative actions found unreasonable and hence denials of equal
protecton include: a statute which denied to an illegitimate child the right of recovery
for the wrongful death of his parents, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); a state
statute which made a member of the armed forces ineligible to vote in any but the
county where he resided at the time he entered the service, Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89 (1965); a state statute which required an unsuccessful appellant to repay the
cost of the transcript used in preparing his appeal only if he were incarcerated, Rinaldi
v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); a state statute which forbade a licensed currency
exchange from doing business on premises other than its own, but which specifically
exempted American Express from the restriction, Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957);
action of city officials in denying to several Jehovah's Witnesses a permit to hold
"Bible talks," where no standard for granting or denying permits existed and similar
permits had been granted before, Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); and, a
state statute forbidding stock companies which wrote fire, casualty, and other types
of insurance to act through agents who were salaried employees but permitting this to
mutual companies that performed essentially the same services, Hartford Steam Boiler
Inspection and Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937).
" Comment, Patronage Dismissals: Constitutional Limits and Political
Justifications, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 306 (1974). The statutory classification makes
two classes of public employees-those protected by civil service laws and those who
are not-who are treated differently with respect to their protection from summary
dismissal. Such classifications are vulnerable to attack under equal protection analy-
sis. O'Neil, supra note 58, at 731.
" Patronage Place, supra note 15, at 1347. Cf., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(invalidating Idaho probate statute which gave arbitrary preference to males over
females in selection of estate administrators, regardless of qualifications of individu-
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ness, mere political affiliation is not a sufficient indication of an
employee's willingness or ability to do the job, at least as to those in
non-policymaking positions. 4 Moreover, if preservation of the two-
party system is the goal, patronage has been shown to be inimical
rather than helpful to the system.8 Thus, political affiliation as a
criterion for dismissal in most cases furthers no purpose that could
not be served by other, more rational, criteria.86
Perhaps the Court rejected the equal protection analysis to avoid
the conclusion that political affiliation had been made a "suspect
classification."8 Such a holding would make the justification of dis-
als); and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (reversing board
ruling excluding petitioner from New Mexico Bar exam where reasons for exclusion had
no rational connection with fitness to practice law).
94 E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), held invalid a federal statute
which made "willful employment" at a "defense facility" unlawful for a member of
the Communist party. The statute established guilt by association alone, and no
showing was made that the defendant's political affiliation made him a security risk.
Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), (striking down an Arkansas statute which
required teachers to disclose all organizations to which they belonged as a condition
of employment.) "[Ihf the information gathered by the required affidavits is used to
further a scheme of terminating the employment of teachers solely because of their
membership in unpopular organizations, that use will run afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 496 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also cases cited in note 50,
supra.
11 Shakman v. Democratic Organization, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970). In
Shakman, democratic patronage practices, which forced support of the party as a
condition of employment, so as to create a substantial political effort in favor of "ins"
and against "outs," was held to result in an unconstitutional inequality in election
procedures. See also White v. Snear, 313 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
" Criteria which would not violate the equal protection requirement are those
generally considered under the broad heading of "cause". Incompetence, recalcitrance
or insubordination are sufficient reasons for discharge which result in no deprivation
of constitutional rights. Comment, Political Affiliations of Non-Civil Service
Employees, 7 SUFFOLK L. R.v. 1098, 1112 (1973). See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974).
" The cases have held race, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); na-
tional origin, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); and alienage, Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), to be "suspect" classes for equal protection purposes.
Dicta in other cases have come close to applying the label to classification based on
sex, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); illegitimacy, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968); and wealth, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). A label
of "suspect" creates a presumption that the classification is not rationally related to
any legitimate government ends, subjecting the class to rigid judicial scrutiny. Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The state then must bear the "heavy
burden of justification" of these classes. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
Pressing public necessity, such as war, may sometimes justify the existence of such
categories, but those based on immutable characteristics such as race or sex most often
cannot be adequately justified to survive.
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missal of policymaking officials on a patronage basis virtually impos-
sible. Although one case supports the contention that political affilia-
tion was already a suspect class,88 the Court did not treat it as such."8
Considering the reluctance of the Court in prior cases to declare a
class to be suspect, 0 such a declaration should not be lightly read into
the Elrod opinion.
Although the result in Elrod was virtually compelled by prior
treatment of first amendment rights, the decision should have little
impact, since non-civil service jobs are only the tip of the patronage
iceberg. Government largess which comprises the bulk of the iceberg
includes money in the form of grants and subsidies; benefits such as
parks; services such as streetlights, sewers and fire protection; supply
and construction contracts; franchises and licenses." These benefits
are much more important because their direct impact covers many
citizens at once, and for that reason are considered more desirable as
rewards and incentives. While appointment to a government job may
generate the gratitude of the appointee and his immediate family,
securing a government contract for an industry generates hundreds
of grateful workers among the politician's constituents.
Although dismissals for patronage reasons infringe protected
rights, hiring may still be done on the basis of political affiliation.
Without the ability to vacate hundreds of jobs at a sweep, however,
politicians will find the importance of patronage hiring practices
greatly reduced. But the classification which the Court deemed irrele-
vant as a basis for dismissal can hardly be relevant as a basis for
hiring. Both are seemingly forbidden by the Constitution." Between
two equally qualified but politically opposite candidates for a nonpol-
m Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), involved an Ohio election statute which
required a new party to obtain the signatures of 15% of the voting population in order
to place a candidate on the ballot. Substantially lesser burdens were placed on two
established parties. Finding that the Ohio system did not merely favor a two-party
system, but favored two particular parties, giving them an oligopoly, the Court held
that the law creates an invidious discrimination based on political affiliation, which
burdens voting and associational rights. Id. at 34.
11 The Court began with a determination that first amendment rights were in-
fringed by the process and then examined the justifications offered by the State. If
political affiliation were a suspect class, plaintiffs need not have shown that specific
rights were infringed. The burden is immediately upon the State to justify the classifi-
cation. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
9o Although the Court has considered many state classifications, they have held
only three to be "suspect." See note 86 supra.
1, Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
92 Schoen, Politics, Patronage and the Constitution, 3 IND. LEGAL FORUM 35, 63
(1969).
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icymaking position, the toss of a coin is a more appropriate method
of awarding the job.1
3
In spite of its limited immediate impact, Elrod v. Burns does
extend the scope of first amendment coverage. Elrod protects every
state government employee from action by the government which
would penalize him for holding certain political beliefs. If used as a
starting point for an attack on the spoils system as a whole, Elrod
could force the development of a genuine alternative to patronage.94
Such a development is desirable because the impact of patronage on
policy constitutes a real danger with which the courts should deal.
Allocations of government services and benefits based on the politi-
cal makeup of communities rather than according to actual needs
ignore the importance of rational planning in an effort to grasp politi-
cal power.95 The difficulty in dealing with the waste and abuse of
power occasioned by the widespread dependence on patronage is that
it primarily exists beneath the surface. Reform in less visible areas,
such as discretionary awards of government contracts, may be more
difficult to achieve after the removal of the only available reminder
of the system's existence.
One cannot realistically expect the legislatures, for whom political
patronage is "a way of life, to deal with the problem earnestly. The
state courts, however, which now must recognize a cause of action for
infringement of first amendment political rights in the area of public
,3 Id. at 77. The prospect of a government job would no longer be an inducement
to participation in the electoral process if this were the case. Other incentives, however,
have grown so in importance that the loss of that one incentive will hardly be felt.
People go into politics both as candidates and rank-and-file workers for a variety of
reasons, including a desire for a political career, economic rewards, personal rewards
(e.g., upward mobility, fellowship, diversions), a desire to influence policymaking, and
a strong adherence to ideology. SORAUF, supra note 1, at 87-90.
21 American politics, in theory and in practice, has never had to develop an alter-
native to patronage. Developed to correct the worst abuses of patronage, civil service
systems have never become a satisfactory replacement because they lack the clear-cut
rewards for services and loyalty that patronage provided. Evidence of growing discon-
tent with civil service has surfaced, particularly in large urban areas where the slug-
gishness of the system is a "detriment to effecting change quickly." TOLCHIN, supra
note 2, at 62, 303-304. Accord, O'Neil, supra note 58, at 728.
11 TOLCHIN, supra note 2, at 111.
96 The best patronage "is subtle, hidden from public view, and protected from the
difficulties that follow from public awareness." TOLCIUN, supra note 2, at 158. Most
patronage power evades the reformers, therefore, because "its real rewards remain in
the shadows of public awareness. As long as they can preserve the judgeships, clerk-
ships, high-level jobs, subsidies, model cities grants, etc., political leaders cannot be
too upset by the low-level clerks or middle-management bureaucrats that fall under
civil service ... " Id. at 305.
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employment, may be persuaded to find similar infringement in other
public areas. In that event, the iceberg of patronage may be gradually
chipped at until it no longer constitutes a hazard to the equitable
distribution of public resources.
PAMELA ROGERS
